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Abstract The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the concept of donation in
health research. Drawing on a set of narrative interviews with people invited to
donate biosamples for research and a range of other studies, we identify several
conceptual themes that speak to the complexity of the current landscape of critical
thinking about donation. These conceptual themes are: the language of ‘donation’;
a hierarchy of biosamples; alternative informational value; narratives as donation;
coincidental donation, convenience and degree of invasiveness; and rights, consent
and beneﬁts of research participation. We call for a reconceptualisation of research
donation to encompass not only the numerous types of sample readily classed as
donations, but also other types of data and contributions, including narrative
interviews, psychometric data, patient-reported outcome measures, record-linkage,
and time and effort. We argue for the development of a pluralist sociology of
research donations, and suggest that a ‘sociology of research contributions’ might
better capture this complexity.
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Health research ‘donations’
In this paper we examine the meaning of ‘donation’ in the health research context, looking not
just at biosamples but other forms of personal donation to research. In biomedicine research
donation is primarily understood as biosamples, bodily ﬂuids and tissue such as urine, blood,
brain, tumour, and embryos. Regulatory frameworks and academic literature have tended to
treat all types of sample as equally signiﬁcant, even though this may not adequately reﬂect the
real-life views and motivations of research donors.
Alongside biosamples, people often give consent for personal biometric and lifestyle infor-
mation to be collected and used, and for medical record linkage. However, such information is
rarely considered through a ‘donation’ lens; rather the debate is framed in terms of data
protection and anonymity.
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People contribute to interdisciplinary health research in a range of other ways, including, for
example, committing time and effort, agreeing to experimental treatments (such as in clinical
trials), taking part in surveys, completing patient-reported outcome measures and giving
interviews.
We suggest that a sociology of ‘donation’ as a single entity is problematic. We seek to
reconceptualise research donation, extending the current ‘hierarchy of donation’ identiﬁed by
Machin and Cherkassky (2015) to encompass these various forms of contribution.
Biosamples and donation
Theorising donation for research takes place against a backdrop of two major competing inﬂu-
ences. On the one hand, Titmuss’s (1970) analysis of blood donation as a ‘gift relationship’
looms large. There is long-standing debate as to how far Titmuss departed from or acknowl-
edges the relevance of traditional anthropological understandings of the gift relationship as a
network of reciprocal obligations (Rapport and Maggs 2002, Tutton 2002). Whatever Titmuss
intended, his emphasis on the ‘free human gift’ with no immediate expectation of return has
been co-opted beyond therapeutic donation (i.e. donation of blood and organs for treatment
purposes) into medical research policy, our focus in this paper.
Altruism has been promoted by medical research agencies as the underpinning principle for
biosample donation (Kanellopoulou 2009, Machin and Cherkassky 2015). People are urged to
donate partly to fulﬁl their desire to help others, but also because this will promote the kind of
community where their donation would be reciprocated (Moorlock et al. 2014). Donation is
less about individual gratiﬁcation and instead about a community duty (Whitﬁeld 2014) that
donors can relate to, generating a sense of solidarity within unknown others in a ‘community’.
For example embryo donors believe they are supporting infertility research, and by default, the
benefactors of their donated embryos are not completely anonymous due to the imaginatively
shared experience of infertility (Scully et al. 2012).
The very word ‘donation’ exempliﬁes this emphasis on altruism – implying a one-way phi-
lanthropic act (see ‘the language of donation’ below). The language of gift has been actively
promoted by government and health agencies to secure human tissue for various uses (Shaw
2008, Tutton 2004). On the other hand, concerns about exploitation of donated material have
led to a body of socio-ethical literature promoting personal property rights over biosamples,
exempliﬁed by the polemical titles of Andrews and Nelkin’s (2001) Body Bazaar: the market
for human tissues in the biotechnology age and Scheper-Hughes’s (2001) ‘Bodies for sale –
whole or in parts’. More recently, Swiss participants expressed anger that they would not be
compensated for giving up their embryos and that through donation researchers were getting
something for nothing (Scully et al. 2012).
Following the Alder Hey scandal in the UK during the 1980s–1990s and the disputed
research use of cancer cells derived without consent from the late Henrietta Lacks in the US
(Hudson and Collins 2013), reasonable concerns about consent and future use of samples have
evolved into a socio-ethical presumption that all body parts deserve special respect and protec-
tion. However, empirical literature suggests the public may not see things through the same
lens as theorists. In previous work, Locock and Boylan (2016) explored whether patients and
healthy members of the public contributing to biobanks saw donation as a gift; while the term
resonated for a few people, for others it seemed exaggerated and even slightly ridiculous.
While people were concerned to some degree about the governance of research and future use
of samples, there was little evidence of wanting to retain property rights or seeing samples as
a special part of oneself. This is consistent with reviews of attitudes to donation (see Hoeyer
2008, Lipworth et al. 2011), suggesting neither a gift nor a property rights model is a good
‘ﬁt’ with public views.
© 2018 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
2 Anne-Marie R. Boylan et al.
Importantly, however, Hoeyer (2008) argues that people’s views vary depending on the type
of tissue being donated and the position of the donors in relation to the research project (for
example whether they are ill or healthy). He also suggests that donors can simultaneously hold
apparently conﬂicting views that a blood sample is ‘both a few drops of blood of no conse-
quence and important as “part of” the donors’. (Hoeyer 2004: 98, original italics). Bahadur
et al. (2010) conﬁrm that context and purpose of donation, the extent to which tissue is seen
as valuable or waste product, and the identity of the potential recipient all play an inﬂuential
role in donor attitudes towards both therapeutic and research donation, speciﬁcally donors’
decisions to donate or not.
Machin and Cherkassky (2015) claim that the context and purpose of donation results in a
hierarchy forming based on the value of a body part or outcome acquired through, and
attached to, the process of donation. As a result, ‘all donors and their donations are therefore
not equal’. (Machin and Cherkassky 2015: 146) Here, we aim to explore and broaden this
hierarchy. By stabilising the hierarchy so that one purpose of donation is the focus, that is,
research, we are able to draw attention to the signiﬁcance of time and effort within donation.
Ontologically, time and effort have rarely been acknowledged as ‘donated’, perhaps as a pro-
duct of what has previously mattered in health research, namely the physical body (discussed
further below). The creation of a donation can require varying investment from a donor
according to what is being donated; for example, compare the physical and emotional labour
for embryo donors to the convenience of donating a urine sample. This element of generating
a donation demonstrates the range of emotional attachment donors can have towards their
donations, raising the question if donating a brain tumour is somehow lower in the hierarchy
than donating aborted foetal tissue, based upon the initial (moral) origins of the donation. In
essence, the epistemological status of the donation can vary according to the ease with which
the donation is collected and acquired, for example, surgery, blood test, and the health status
of the donor, collected as part of ‘care’ received or optional and chosen by a healthy donor.
By focusing on the time and effort considerations to facilitate research donation, we argue that
a broader view is required for ‘what’ can be ‘donated’, with implications for how we under-
stand and make sense of ‘donation’ today.
Beyond biosamples - other forms of personal research donation?
We seek to widen the debate on research ‘donation’ away from its traditional dominant focus
on body parts and ﬂuids, to consider other ways that people may make deeply personal contri-
butions to health research, including narratives, personal data, and time and effort. These dif-
fering forms of donation are rarely considered together in clinical research discourse, reﬂecting
a biomedically driven conception of what matters in health research – namely the purely phys-
ical body – rather than a socially driven, experiential understanding of the self. Drawing on
the work of Merleau-Ponty, who argued the inextricable link between mind and body, we con-
test this current conception, propose that it is lacking and argue for a broader deﬁnition.
Since the seventeenth century, the body has come to be viewed through the scientiﬁc lens,
as ‘a material object whose anatomical and functional properties can be characterised accord-
ing to general scientiﬁc law’ (Leder 1990: 5). The contents and processes of the mind, and
experiential information collected by the body over time have often been relegated in much
medical research to a second class of subjectively-informed knowledge, compared with objec-
tive, scientiﬁcally-generated knowledge. Therefore, it is unsurprising that clinical research has
primarily focused on the body as a resource for measurable, observable biosample donations.
Merleau-Ponty (1962) rejected Cartesian dualism, the notion that the body is an object like
any other, and argued that human bodies are distinct from other objects and provide a means
for communication with the world. Thus, the human body is not only a set of donatable parts,
© 2018 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
From waste product to blood, brains and narratives 3
masses, ﬂuids and samples, but a complex organism interacting with its environment to
produce an ongoing store of experiences. These experiences are gathered through physical
communication with the world – seeing, hearing, sensing, tasting, touching and, through a ser-
ies of neural processes, are given emotional colour, interpreted, converted to memories and
stored for future recall. The body is the meeting point between the person and the world, and
is our means for having a world; as such, all experience is embodied. So the body as ‘some-
thing one “has” . . . has to be augmented with an understanding of the body as something that
one “is” . . . the medium by which we are able to live our lives, and establish and sustain an
individual, reﬂexive (capable of self-reﬂection) identity’ (Fox 2012: 49)
We therefore suggest that ‘donations’ of experiential information or personal data are in fact
embodied as they require a state of embodiment to exist. When making physical donations to
research, people also donate time and effort – that which is directly involved in the donation
process and that which is involved in getting there (e.g. travel, preparation, fasting, childcare
arrangements, annual leave). Personal information (e.g. cognitive function, lung capacity,
height and weight) and access to medical records also pertain to the body. For example, when
the body was born; its age; its previous history of interactions with medical interventions, pro-
cedures, drugs and vaccines. Future personal information, in the form of medical record link-
age, may link bodily disease to biosamples many years down the track. Tutton (2002: 537)
contrasts what he calls the ‘corporeal’ economy of blood transfusion, in which blood itself is
the valuable life-saving thing, with ‘the informational economy of research’ in which blood is
only valuable as a route to getting information about DNA. Therefore, more attention on infor-
mational ‘donation’ is warranted.
But not only is our body the storage facility containing our repertoire of experiences, it is
the means through which we verbalise our experiences. As Merleau-Ponty (1964: 5) asserts;
‘The body is much more than an instrument or a means; it is our expression in the world, the
visible form of our intentions’. When people take part in narrative research, they are contribut-
ing opinions, values, thoughts, reﬂections and emotions derived from their physical and mental
experiences. We suggest that the hierarchy of research donations should be expanded to
include donations of the mind as well as of the body.
Methods
Our purpose in this paper is to stimulate further conceptual discussion of future directions for
research within the sociology of donations ﬁeld. While this article is intended to be primarily
reﬂective, we feel it is important to ground any such reﬂection in the views of real people,
rather than hypothetical ethical or theoretical considerations which may hold little meaning or
relevance for research participants. In this we follow Shaw’s (2015: 952–3) methodological
approach, aiming to ‘expand the conceptual toolkit’ in a way that is ‘both analytical and
empirically oriented, drawing on research that links a series of qualitative sociological studies’.
Our analysis is primarily what Heaton (2004: 38) deﬁnes as ‘supra-analysis’, secondary analy-
sis which ‘transcends the focus of the primary study . . . examining new empirical, theoretical
or methodological questions’. We draw in particular on a narrative interview study conducted
jointly by authors one and two in 2010–11 with 21 people (Table 1) who had been invited to
give biosamples for research (approved by Berkshire Research Ethics Committee Ref 09/
H0505/66). The aim of this study was to explore people’s experiences of, and attitudes
towards biobanking and biosample donation, both for speciﬁc local research studies and for
national repositories such as the UK Biobank.
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However, we also draw more broadly on a linked series of previous studies of medical
research participation and involvement, examining people’s experiences of and motivations for
such activity (Crocker et al. 2016, Locock et al. 2017, Locock and Smith 2011a, 2011b). As
we extend our discussion to non-bodily forms of research donation we draw also on our wider
experience of, and reﬂections on conducting narrative health research in the UK, including pri-
mary and secondary analysis. Ethical approval for all these studies included consent for sec-
ondary analysis.
All three authors met for two days of discussion to workshop the data, reﬂect on the litera-
ture and develop the conceptual themes.
Conceptual themes
From our reﬂections on the literature and the empirical data, we identify several conceptual
themes which explore the various dimensions of research donation and extend our thinking
Table 1 Sample characteristics, biobanking study
Participant Type of biobanking/sample Gender and age
01 Blood and tumour samples, cancer; blood, saliva and urine,
population biobank
F, 55
02 Blood and tumour samples, cancer M, 58
03 Healthy volunteer, population biobank (declined) M, 43
04 Healthy volunteer, blood samples and fat biopsies, diabetes
research (declined population biobank)
F, 49
05 Blood samples, cancer F, 52
06 Healthy volunteer, blood, saliva and urine, population biobank F, 49
07 Healthy volunteer, blood, saliva and urine, population biobank;
blood samples and fat biopsies, diabetes research
F, 52
08 Blood and liver tissue samples, Hepatitis C Virus M, 54
09 Blood and spinal ﬂuid samples, Motor Neurone Disease; blood
samples, MND DNA bank
F, 56
10 Blood samples, Hepatitis C Virus M, 66
11 Healthy volunteer, blood samples and fat biopsies, diabetes
research (accepted and declined on different occasions)
M, 49
12 Blood and spinal ﬂuid samples, Motor Neurone Disease M, 63
13 Blood samples and post-mortem brain bank, Motor Neurone
Disease (spinal ﬂuid samples declined)
M, 61
14 Healthy volunteer, blood samples, stroke study as family
member control; blood, saliva and urine, population biobank
F, 62
15 Blood and urine samples, high risk pregnancy; healthy volunteer,
blood, saliva and urine, population biobank
F, 45
16 Blood samples, Motor Neurone Disease (spinal ﬂuid samples
declined)
M, 54
17 Blood and urine samples, high risk pregnancy F, 37
18 Blood samples, Hepatitis C Virus M, 49
19 Healthy volunteer, blood and umbilical cord blood samples,
pregnancy biobank
F (age withheld)
20 Healthy volunteer, blood and urine, population biobank M, 33
21 Healthy volunteer, blood and urine, population biobank F, 44
© 2018 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
From waste product to blood, brains and narratives 5
beyond traditional models: the language of ‘donation’; a hierarchy of biosamples: from tumour
to blood, brains and bodies, from waste to value; alternative informational value; narratives as
donation; coincidental donation, convenience and degree of invasiveness; and rights, consent
and beneﬁts of research participation.
The language of ‘donation’
Language both reﬂects and shapes how researchers and participants understand the purpose
and act of donation, and the nature of what is donated. Examining the language used can
thus shed light on underlying assumptions. The very word ‘donation’ is problematic, conjur-
ing up an image of charity, voluntarism and selﬂess giving to an imagined or ‘ﬁctive’ other
(Whitﬁeld 2013). ‘Donor’ similarly calls to mind both philanthropy and – in the medical
context – the therapeutic act of the blood donor and organ donor. Whitﬁeld identiﬁes the
use of ‘donor’ as a wartime propaganda device in response to the marketing challenge of
attracting people to give blood to newly collectivised, mechanised and impersonal blood
banks.
Drawing on the analogy of donating unwanted items to a charity shop, O’Neill (2009) sug-
gests that three criteria must be met for the word ‘donation’ to apply:
1. the item is surplus to our needs;
2. we can easily replace it if needed, if the surplus does not last; and
3. the recipient is an anonymous needy individual.
She argues that although therapeutic blood donation does seem to meet these criteria, generally
‘bodily donations are obviously different from giving to Oxfam’ (O’Neill 2009: 154). In fact
in our studies, Jane1 explicitly compared giving tumour samples for research to recycling
unwanted Christmas gifts ‘through the charity shop’. O’Neill focuses primarily on therapeutic
rather than research donation but does consider dead body donation for anatomical research.
This she concludes does not meet the criteria, because although the body may be surplus to
the individual’s needs, families may still feel a ‘need’ for an intact body and the idea of it
being easily replaceable makes no sense. Furthermore (echoing Whitﬁeld) she suggests the
donation to an intermediate organisation, such as a university, removes even the ‘ﬁctive’ needy
individual from the equation.
In a previous paper (Locock and Boylan 2016), we noted that while the verbs ‘give’ and
‘donate’ were used readily in people’s talk about biosamples, the noun ‘gift’ seemed to hold
more substantial meaning as something deliberate and almost ceremonial, distinct from the
everyday word ‘giving’. In our studies Debbie laughed at the idea that giving a urine sample
for research might be a gift. She mimed the act of handing over a present, saying sarcastically,
‘Hello, happy birthday’. While this might not be true of all types of sample, and people fre-
quently distinguished blood from other types of sample (see ‘a hierarchy of donations’ below),
it underlines the complexity of seeing ‘donation’ as a single process with a common meaning
for all parties. Mahon-Daly (2012: 234–5) in her study of blood donation notes different atti-
tudes in people using ‘donate’ or give’, arguing that language of ‘donating their blood was
linked to more expression of altruism . . . Donating infers a bestowing action, with the freedom
for the recipient to do what they want with the gift. Giving may be more like “letting someone
have”’. However, her suggestion that the latter ‘implies that the giver wants to have a say in
the gift after it has been given’ does not resonate with our ﬁndings, which suggest ‘giving’
was a much more casual act.
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In the research donation context, we reﬂect that nouns such as ‘sample’, ‘biosample’,
‘material’ and ‘tissue’ may also generate particular meanings, redolent of objectifying scientiﬁc
practice. They may exercise a depersonalising effect, distancing the item to be scrutinised from
the person. We are unable to think of any parallel collective word in therapeutic donation,
where the discourse is more likely to be around what speciﬁcally is given (blood donation,
organ donation, bone marrow donation). The verb ‘harvest’ occurs both in ofﬁcial information
and in the talk of donors. While the implication of fruitful productivity has a certain positive
note, ‘harvest’ also conveys an impersonal and almost industrial process.
Narratives and personal medical data are rarely conceptualised using the same language as
that used to describe biosamples, which may minimise their potential for being considered as
donations. But people routinely talk about ‘giving’ an interview, and interviews, personal
information and information contained in medical records, conceivably meet O’Neill’s (2009)
criteria for donations. We explore this further in ‘alternative information value’.
A hierarchy of biosamples: from tumour to blood, brains and bodies, from waste to
value
In line with Hoeyer’s (2004) and Bahadur et al.’s (2010) conclusions that the type of sample
affects the attitude of the donor, we have also found a spectrum of concern, from distasteful
waste product at one end to valued, life-giving material at the other. Perhaps the most extreme
form of waste product is tumour, which is not just passively unwanted in the sense of being
of no value, but actively unwanted in the sense of being a harmful ‘thing’, invading the body.
In cancer and other serious diseases, donation to research may be experienced as the taking
back of control over one’s body and illness. The excised tumour – which would otherwise
simply be thrown away with the rubbish – is harnessed for good, perhaps diminishing its
threatening and repellent nature. It is certainly ‘surplus to requirements’, as O’Neill (2009)
suggests, though the ideas that anyone would want to replace a tumour or that an ‘anonymous
needy individual’, in this case a scientiﬁc researcher, is waiting for it are less relevant.
Nonetheless, particularly in the context of possibly hereditary cancers, participants could antic-
ipate a direct familial beneﬁt for their own descendants, as well as a more diffuse beneﬁt to
‘other people like me in future’.
Urine and saliva may fall further along the continuum, unvalued and faintly distasteful, but
not as toxic as tumour samples. Urine, in particular, is difﬁcult for people to conceptualise as
valuable to anyone other than a researcher. People may struggle to see why donating some-
thing that would otherwise be ﬂushed down the toilet could ever be considered controversial,
risky or indeed special. Saliva can be understood as a source of valuable DNA information
(for example in forensic dramas or paternity cases); even so in our participants it evoked
remarkably little concern.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of live biosample donations lies blood, with all its
physical and symbolic signiﬁcance. Blood keeps us alive; it represents familial bonds (‘blood
relatives’); and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition it holds sacramental and sacriﬁcial meaning.
Blood-related metaphors permeate the language: we talk of something ‘coursing through our
veins’ or being ‘in our blood’, conveying something essential to our identity. Yet even in the
case of blood, people may take a very pragmatic and unconcerned attitude to its use for
research. Gerry, a participant who had Motor Neurone Disease (MND), said he wouldn’t think
twice about ‘a few phials of blood’. Jim, who had hepatitis C, said he saw blood in a similar
way to other tissue samples he had given over the years, drawing on an objectifying metaphor
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of the body as something he viewed ‘quite mechanically’ and highlighting the ability of blood
and cells to replace themselves.
However, our participants’ accounts suggest that keeping a clear separation between
research and therapeutic donation of blood can be hard. Blood donation – perhaps because of
Titmuss or many media campaigns – seems strongly associated in the public imagination with
therapeutic donation and saving lives, and narratives often slipped into this territory. Debbie,
for example, having laughed at the idea of urine as a gift, drew a speciﬁc contrast between
blood and other bodily ﬂuids, drawing on her own past history of both giving and receiving
blood for therapeutic purposes.
Asked speciﬁcally whether this applied to research blood donation, she conﬁrmed that she
still saw it in these terms ‘because I’m always amazed at how much information they get out
of how little’. We return to this in ‘Alternative informational value’.
Research biodonations after death – either speciﬁc body parts which can only be donated
after death, such as brains and corneas, or whole bodies for scientiﬁc research – represent a
very different form of donation to ‘live’ biosample donation. Organs such as hearts, eyes and
brains carry an emotional investment which may make them “troubling to donate compared
with ‘lesser’ body parts or materials even when the donation takes place post-mortem.” (Baha-
dur et al. 2010: 871).
Duncan had already signed up to give his brain to an MND research ‘brain bank’. He said
it was an obvious decision – ‘a bit of a no-brainer’. Steve, a cancer patient, could not under-
stand why ‘people get all precious about it’. Like Duncan, he took a pragmatic view of death
and waste, commenting that the body is ‘either burnt or it rots, one of the two’, so it might as
well be ‘put to good use’.
Others expressed uncertainty and in some cases a degree of squeamishness. Bruce found
brain donation and his own death ‘an odd thing to think about’. Here and in other cases the
squeamishness seemed less about the speciﬁc body part and more the sheer fact of mortality
and the dead body. Aileen held a similar view that ‘when you’re dead, you’re dead’, but iden-
tiﬁed a certain ‘horror factor’, perhaps akin to Midgley’s (2000) ‘yuk factor’ in relation to
biotechnology. Debbie, although willing in principle to donate her brain, found the idea of a
‘brain bank’ ‘really horrendous’, and joked ‘I would like to withdraw a brain, please’.
Alongside the brain, donations involving the eyes and corneas evoke similarly mixed emo-
tions. Anne, a healthy volunteer, contrasted her own pragmatic view about using body parts
after her death with that of family members, who were ‘very happy to donate some things but
not other things’, explaining ‘lots of people can’t bear the idea of donating their eyes’.
Whole-body donation after death is also a source of conﬂicting and ambivalent views. Jane,
who had not thought about it before, felt brain donation for research would be acceptable, but
felt less sure about whole-body donation, especially use of her body by medical students and
the ‘feeling of being scrutinised’.
Ellen, by contrast, was actively considering donating her whole body to medical science.
She cried as she recalled a TV programme about how one medical school holds a ‘service of
thanks every year for the families of those who have donated their bodies . . . it makes me
even more inclined to do it’.
In the few years before the ﬁeldwork was conducted, Gunther von Hagens’ ‘Bodyworlds’
exhibition of plastinated bodies had visited the UK and a human dissection was shown on TV.
This seemed a step too far for some people. In Steve’s words:
I wouldn’t like the indignity of being dissected in public like that German guy did recently
. . . An organ, speciﬁc organs I wouldn’t have a problem with.
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A common thread in these views is the importance of bodily dignity and a sense that the body
is the self, requiring respect and shielding from inappropriate scrutiny. As Steve implies, this
is in contrast to ‘speciﬁc organs’ – as in living donation, people express nuances and
gradations within donation after death, which are rarely reﬂected in the media or the academic
literature.
Alternative informational value
Earlier we noted how Debbie articulated that the value of blood samples for research lay not
so much in its life-giving properties but in the information derived from it. This prompted her
to somewhat re-evaluate her views about the informational value of urine. This resonates with
Machin and Cherkassky’s (2015) emphasis on how the purpose of donation may generate dif-
ferent meanings. Yet intuitively Debbie could not believe urine was likely to yield as much
valuable information as blood. Informational value is not necessarily immediately obvious.
While biosamples are traditionally seen as ‘donations’, other forms of information are differ-
ently conceptualised and differently valued, not even featuring in the assumed hierarchy of
donations. When donating to the biobank, people are usually asked to consent to linking their
data to their medical records and to provide accompanying personal information. Linking to
medical records results in a holistic picture of current health to be established, allows for infor-
mation to be tracked over the life course and for the development of future information
through research, for example, genetic marker studies. Other information might include ques-
tionnaires about lifestyle, psychometric measures of cognitive functioning, and other biomet-
rics, such as measurements of weight, height, BMI, blood pressure, etc. The participants
recognised the value in this information: Janet explained that although it is not hard and fast
like that gleaned from a blood test, it is important to give honest answers.
It’s very tempting to exaggerate where you know it’s good to do it and underplay it when
it’s good not to, like the alcohol. But . . . unless we give honest answers here it’s not going
to help the research. And when it comes to things like your blood test, then you can’t fake
that, so why fake the other parts of it?
Biosamples, seen as objective, scientiﬁc samples containing encoded information that requires
careful work to extract, are judged inherently more valuable than self-reported information,
which is considered likely to be inaccurate. However, the linkage and triangulation of a range
of data is more valuable than any single sample alone, consistent with Hoeyer’s assertion that
more value lies in the information derived from the sample than in the sample itself. This rein-
forces the case for widening the deﬁnition of donation beyond biosamples alone.
Narratives as donation
Also neglected from the traditional hierarchy of donation, the value held by narrative inter-
views donated to qualitative health research studies is distinct. Biosamples and supplementary
information require each other to extract maximum value, whereas the value of a narrative is
more self-contained and intrinsic, and both need interpretation and analysis to achieve their full
value. Mazanderani et al. (2013) extend Mitchell and Waldby’s (2010) notion of biovalue in
relation to tissue samples to the value which may be derived from narrative interviews. This
‘biographical value’ may include value to social scientists, clinical researchers and doctors, in
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understanding better the embodied experience of illness, but also value to the self and to other
patients. Narratives (particularly those of celebrities’) could also raise the proﬁle of a disease
and generate pressure for research funding and better treatment.
In donating an interview to health research, people may consent to the archiving of their
interview for use in secondary analysis, meaning that after their participation has ceased,
potentially after their death, their narrative still exists, and still has a purpose for social
science. Just as donated bodies can be used in a variety of settings (education and training,
research, organ harvesting, etc.), interviews can be repurposed to answer different research
questions. Equally, donated interviews should be treated with the same dignity with which
people expect their bodies to be treated after death, starting with informed consent and ensur-
ing they are fully informed about the potential future uses of their donated experiences.
Stories of personal experience may contribute to research in ways which go beyond data
collection and research participation. In the UK, the involvement of patients and members of
the public (‘PPI’) in research has become an accepted part of research process. This may
include reviewing information sheets to setting research priorities and designing research stud-
ies. Patients bring their physical and emotional experience of illness and treatment to bear on
research to improve its relevance and acceptability for other people. Although there is a sub-
stantial literature on motivations for PPI, which includes discussion of altruism, voluntarism
and the potential to help others, this has not to our knowledge previously been couched in
terms of ‘research donation’.
Returning to O’Neill’s criteria for how we understand donation, ﬁrst, interviews and other
additional information are surplus to our needs. Second, such donations do not need to be
replenished – stories of personal experience can be retold or reinterpreted and giving personal
information does not create a deﬁcit. Finally, many people who give their stories say they
were motivated by altruism or to ensure others have improved experiences (Lucius-Hoene
et al. 2013, Peel et al. 2006). Michael, a biobanking participant with Hepatitis C, was happy
when the consultant asked him to tell his story to a group of medical students:
I poured my heart out to them. One in twelve people have this horrible, evil little virus, and
I want to do as much as I can to help others and to help this study.
Coincidental donation, convenience and degree of invasiveness
As the above suggests, another factor affecting people’s attitudes to donating biosamples is not
just the nature of the sample being taken but also the level of burden, discomfort, time and
effort involved, and indeed perceived personal beneﬁt, factors which inevitably affect
contributions to other types of research, such as narrative interviews or indeed clinical trial
participation.
People in our studies providing research biosamples during the course of their treatment
commonly regarded this as uncontroversial and were unconcerned about future uses. One said,
‘it’s not as if you’ve got to go into hospital for special surgery or to have extra blood taken’.
Even if extra visits are required, this may not be seen as particularly inconvenient. Ellen, who
gave additional blood and urine samples during her IVF pregnancy, recalled the research mid-
wives being ‘terribly apologetic’ that this would involve an extra blood and urine test every
month but she was ‘very, very happy to do all of this’.
We also spoke to several people who had been invited to take part in the UK Biobank,
involving a two-hour visit to a special UK Biobank centre. This degree of inconvenience was
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certainly off-putting for some. Aileen (a frequent participant in diabetes research) explained
that a letter came with a ﬁxed appointment time and it ‘just didn’t ﬁt in with what was going
on at that time’ so she opted out.
Yet her commitment to the diabetes research centre was extensive and often involved
lengthy visits which she said she enjoyed. Others took part willingly in the UK Biobank,
although – as is often the case with research participation – not necessarily having read the
leaﬂet fully.
At the more invasive end of the spectrum, four of our participants who had MND had con-
tributed to an MND biobank which included giving spinal ﬂuid samples via lumbar puncture.
Such an invasive procedure creates a wholly different experience of donation. In this case par-
ticipants were offered the option to take part in other aspects of the study, but omit the lumbar
puncture, which Duncan and Gerry did. Duncan previously had a bad experience of it, and
Gerry explained that although he did not normally mind needles and blood samples, ‘It was
just that one area of the body I just didn’t want them to touch’.
By contrast Sam agreed to have a lumbar puncture, saying ‘I have a good pain threshold
and my one thought always is, “I’m going to help, no matter how uncomfortable, how long it
takes”‘.
We also spoke to several healthy participants in diabetes research, some of whom consented
to invasive procedures (being injected with adrenaline and then having fat biopsies taken from
the abdomen and thigh). Aileen had withdrawn from one study which required a blood sample
from an artery in her leg because it was too painful:
It did put me off slightly at the time . . . Because they’ve got more invasive as they’ve gone
on you do start to think, “Do I really want to go through this?” But having said that, if the
letter came through next week or in a month’s time, I’d probably do it again.
Motivation to donate biosamples in our studies was often tied to people’s jobs (e.g. Aileen
was a healthcare assistant) or family history. Another regular participant at the diabetes
research centre had a family history of heart disease and high cholesterol, and found the regu-
lar blood tests reassuring. As the son of a pathologist, he was familiar with biosample
research. Commonly people used terms like ‘giving back’ to the NHS for care received, by
themselves or family.
Willingness to get involved in such invasive testing may thus depend on a range of factors,
including perceived personal health and other beneﬁts; familiarity with healthcare and health
research; a sense of moral commitment and diffuse reciprocity; perceived degree of risk or dis-
comfort; and severity of illness. Arguably any research donation requires a certain amount of
time and inconvenience, and the impact of this should not be minimised. Time getting to the
appointment may be invisible to researchers. One UK Biobank participant said she put a fruit-
cake in the oven before heading to the appointment, in the belief (having not read the leaﬂet)
that ‘I was going to pop along, give a blood test, answer a few questions and whip away. And
if it said two hours would I still have done it?’
Time and effort must be brought into the discussion about donation, and not solely when
thinking about barriers and facilitators. Widening the deﬁnition to include these factors encour-
ages researchers to be mindful of what donation entails and ensures that the donor is respected
and credited for every aspect of their participation. In comparison with lumbar punctures and
other physical donations, narrative donations may perhaps seem minimally invasive on the sur-
face. However, participating in an interview requires time, the amount of which is often inde-
terminable at the outset, and mental effort – recalling and describing past experiences, worries,
thoughts, and managing the emotional labour involved in the process. Despite being seen as
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‘inherently innocuous’ (Peel et al. 2006), narrative interviews can focus on sensitive topics
that invoke a range of emotions; they can be enjoyable, but can also arouse feelings of anger
and distress (Lucius-Hoene et al. 2013, Peel et al. 2006,). The speciﬁcs of the time and effort
involved in narrative donation, requires us to think differently about according them a position
in the hierarchy of donations.
Rights, consent and beneﬁts of research participation
A consistent theme across our studies (including participation in clinical trials and cohort stud-
ies as well as biobanking) has been not just willingness to participate in research, but active
enthusiasm for doing so and a strong sense of personal gain. This is not simply a ‘therapeutic
misconception’, as it is often described, but rather a rational assessment of a wide range of
personal beneﬁts, including enjoyment and satisfaction, learning about science, enhanced rela-
tionships with a clinical team providing your care, and increased monitoring or feedback about
one’s health. (Locock and Boylan 2016, Locock and Smith 2011b). Over several studies, a
theme of disappointment has emerged that the right to be told about research opportunities in
the NHS Constitution is not always enacted.
This assessment is underpinned by trust in regulation and in the source of the invitation to
take part. This is not to say that people feel information and consent are unimportant; rather
many feel they should have a choice about how much depth they want to go into, and that if
they wish to make their decision based on cursory reading of the information that is their adult
right. In saying this, they mirror the behaviour of most of us when faced with lengthy terms
and conditions – they tick the box and move on (Bakos et al. 2014). Of course some people
want to read every detail, and some people are inherently cautious about sharing their data.
The phrase ‘Big Brother’ was used more than once in connection with the UK Biobank and
suspicion about the use to which samples might be put in future. But many people seem
relaxed about this, particularly in the case of ‘waste’ material such as tumour or urine. We
have found little evident sense of property rights, and considerable concern about burdensome
over-reactions to situations such as Alder Hey, as Bruce argued:
I never understood all this fuss that came out – I know what they did at Alder Hey wasn’t
transparent, but I don’t think it was wrong . . .This incredible bureaucracy that was loaded
on the NHS to track down body parts . . .You get the impression that any bit of your body
they take, you have to sign a consent form or you can expect to ask for it back next year
. . . I’m not hugely attached to my body and I hope nobody else will be after I’m dead, and
certainly to the extent of lumbering a stretched NHS with extra costs just for a bit of . . . I
mean, I trim my toenails and they go in the bin. [laughs]
Taking part in narrative interview studies in health research certainly offers potential for per-
sonal beneﬁt. In their study about participation in qualitative interviews, Lucius-Hoene et al.
(2013) reported that participants found the experience exceptional as they had an opportunity
to talk uninterrupted about their condition and to be taken seriously by the interviewer. The
interview presented an opportunity to reﬂect on their feeling about their illness and learn about
themselves. Many of their participants found it an important and deeply moving experience,
describing it as a liberating and pleasurable event that made them feel valued and renewed
their sense of engagement with their lives. But for others it was a more negative experience,
causing them to feel anger and distress. For a third group it did not seem to hold any positive
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or negative signiﬁcance. This lack of signiﬁcance chimes with the notion of interview partici-
pation as ‘inherently innocuous’ (Peel et al. 2006).
These experiences of interview studies resonate with how people talk about their experi-
ences of donating biosamples: donation can be meaningful and beneﬁcial; or donation may not
be particularly signiﬁcant and may be easy and uncontroversial to do; and it can occasionally
be negative, perhaps experienced as burdensome, invasive or painful.
Concluding remarks
As Bahadur et al. (2010: 872) argue, ‘one of the signiﬁcant limitations of principalist,
bioethics-based regulatory governance is that . . . it necessarily presupposes that all donors
have a standard set of concerns and moral values’.
In this paper we have added to the evidence that such a ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ understanding of
research donation is not helpful. We argue for a more nuanced understanding of biosamples,
but also crucially that other forms of research contribution, including narratives, lifestyle and
biometric data, agreement to take part in a study and involvement in research design, can all
be conceived of as forms of embodied donation.
Biosample donation takes widely differing forms with very different consequences for indi-
vidual donors; yet much of the ethical literature and research ethics processes treat all bodily
samples as equivalent – equally risky, equally concerning, and equally in need of stringent
conditions. Equally, relatively low-risk research studies using qualitative methods or gathering
self-report information are treated to similar levels of ethical scrutiny. This discourse takes lit-
tle account of the real-life responses of actual participants. Hoeyer (2010) has challenged
attempts by scholars, faced with contradictory data about people’s attitudes, to ﬁnd an underly-
ing consensus, and establish a single universal principle for conceptualising the relationship
with donors. He queries whether generic terms such as ‘biobank’ and ‘donor’ are ﬁt for pur-
pose in capturing this variety of motivations and wishes.
It is easy to argue that casual attitudes to donation among patients result from simple lack
of awareness; certainly in interviewing or gathering self-report information it is possible to cre-
ate more anxiety by asking questions, and presenting scenarios where the potential for harm is
foregrounded. The very act of questioning people or involving them in a hypothetical delibera-
tive process may plant a seed of doubt that their judgements have been under-informed and
they ‘ought’ to think differently as responsible citizens (Hoeyer 2003). But a counter-argument
– that people are mature decision-makers who have a right to take a casual attitude if they
wish – is rarely made. The right to donate, the right to trust in researchers and research regula-
tion, and the right not to have to read lengthy, impenetrable and risk-averse participant infor-
mation get little attention compared to the right to anonymity, and concerns about data
protection, bodily integrity and autonomy.
Hoeyer (2010) notes a move to adopt the term ‘participant’ rather than ‘donor’:
to acknowledge the ongoing mutual nature of the relationship . . . and to avoid connotations
to an over-and-done-with ‘gift’. We might, however, thereby overemphasise the element of
participation. It is not an equal relationship and some donors will wish to limit their work-
load and obligations rather than enhance their inﬂuence on decision-making. Rather than
emphasising participation I believe researchers should ask themselves what type of relation-
ship speciﬁc donors have opted for when agreeing to participate’.
Thus even within the biobanking world, a pluralist sociology of donations is needed.
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Moving beyond biosamples, other types of contribution, including supplementary information
(medical records, cognitive tests, lifestyle questionnaires, etc.), qualitative interviews, clinical
trial participation, general time and effort in taking part in research, and even patient
involvement in research design, have traditionally and regrettably been omitted from the
donation literature. We argue that not only should they be regarded as donations in their
own right, but their contribution to more valuable triangulated information that allows for
increased scientiﬁc endeavour, sometimes over many years, must be acknowledged and fur-
ther explored. There is an important place for this type of donation, which further demon-
strates the need to pluralise current deﬁnitions of ‘donation’. The donation is not just the
sample, but is so much more – and so much else. The ongoing nature of many research
contributions ﬁts with the concept of ‘dynamic consent’ in biobanking (Kaye et al. 2015),
which provides continuing digital contact with participants and enables them to see and
agree to how both samples and data may be re-used beyond the original purpose if they
wish. Kaye et al. suggest dynamic consent could extend to other forms of clinical research
beyond biobanking; we believe the idea could usefully be applied to narrative social science
research too.
In past work, author two has focused on motivations for taking part in clinical trials, and
particularly the degree of perceived personal beneﬁt involved, challenging the discourse of
altruism, which is so routinely invoked (Locock and Smith 2011a, 2011b). Neat dichotomies
between personal beneﬁt and beneﬁting others – between ‘altruistic’ donation and self-inter-
est – fail to capture the messiness of real people’s motivations. Lucius-Hoene et al. (2013)
have shown how the same complexity exists in reasons for narrative research participation.
A pluralist sociology of research donations needs to embrace not just hierarchies of different
types of donation and varying levels of value attached to them, but also the range of moti-
vations and the shifting boundary between donation and exchange. We suggest that a ‘soci-
ology of research contributions’ might be a more nuanced way to express the mutual and
sometimes ongoing relationship between researchers and participants across a range of study
types.
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Note
1 Where primary data is used for illustration, we have changed participants’ names.
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